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Abstract 
 
A Japanese General Social Survey is used to re-examine how voluntary giving 
is associated with inequality aversion, and how the relationship differs between high- 
and low-income groups. This paper also investigates how social capital influences that 
relationship. The key findings are that (1) the level of voluntary giving increases with 
inequality aversion for high-income groups, but not for low-income groups, and (2) 
social capital accumulated in the respondent’s residential area reinforces the positive 
influence of inequality aversion on voluntary giving for high-income groups only.  
 
JEL classification: H41, C34, C35, D63, Z13.  
Keywords: Inequality aversion, charitable contribution, trust, private provision of 
public goods. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Derin-Güre and Uler (2010) used a General Social Survey (GSS) conducted in the 
United States to examine how an individual’s inequality aversion influenced charitable 
giving. They found a positive association between inequality aversion and charitable 
giving for high-income earners and a negative association for low-income earners. 
In addition to an individual’s characteristics, the economic environment of an 
individual’s residential area is thought to influence a person’s charitable behavior 
(Fehr and Schmidt 1999). For instance, labor union member density is positively 
related to per capita donations (Zullo 2011). Putnam (2000) stated that the degree of 
community involvement is considered a type of social capital, which facilitates 
coordination and cooperation to increase social welfare. In contrast, “an envious or 
malicious person presumably would feel better off if some other persons become worse 
off in certain respects. He could “harm” himself (i.e., spend his own resources) to harm 
others” (Becker 1996, 190). Social interaction among people plays an important role in 
terms of an individual’s decision making because the utility function of a person 
includes the reactions of others to his/her actions (Becker 1974). Frequent interactions 
among community members are thought to increase negative externalities such as 
envy toward richer members.1 Accordingly, a hypothesis is proposed that community 
participation increases the positive effect of an individual’s inequality aversion on the 
private voluntary contributions of high-income earners. Using individual-level data 
from Japan, this paper aims to test the above hypothesis.  
                                                   
1 Yamamura (2012) suggested that richer people prefer income redistribution in areas 
with higher rates of community participation, which implies that negative 
externalities lead richer people to be more altruistic. 
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2. Data and Model  
This study uses data sourced from a Japanese General Social Survey (JGSS), 
which was designed as a Japanese counterpart to the GSS in the United States.2 
Therefore, this paper presents findings that can be compared with those of Derin-Güre 
and Uler (2010), who provided evidence based on GSS data. However, the JGSS only 
provides data regarding private charitable contributions from 2005, although the 
JGSS was conducted from 2000 to 2010. Hence, this paper uses a 2005 data set based 
on JGSS data. Following Derin-Güre and Uler (2010), the study sample here was 
divided into three groups (high-income, middle-income, low-income). Respondents who 
considered themselves above or high above average income earners are classified as 
high-income, average earners are classified as middle-income, and below average and 
far below average are classified as low-income. 
Following Derin-Güre and Uler (2010), the estimated function takes the 
following form: 
CONTRIBUTi = 0 + 1 INEQLi + 2 Social capital m + 3 Age i + 4 Marry i + 5 Number 
of Child i + 6 Male i + 7 Schooling i + 8 Income i + m  ui ,  
where CONTRIBUT i  is the private charitable contributions of individual i, which is 
estimated by yen value. Regression parameters are denoted by  and ui is the error 
term. Individuals appear to be influenced by the various experiences and 
circumstances that surround the area they grew up in. To capture this effect, this 
study incorporates  m, which are dummies for prefecture m where respondents 
                                                   
2Data for this secondary analysis, “Japanese General Social Surveys (JGSS), Ichiro 
Tanioka,” was provided by the Social Science Japan Data Archive, Information Center 
for Social Science Research on Japan, Institute of Social Science, The University of 
Tokyo. 
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resided at 15 years of age. A Japanese prefecture is the equivalent to a state in the 
United States or a province in Canada. Dependent variable, CONTRIBUT m is 
interval-coded data and this study uses an interval regression model for the 
estimations (Wooldridge 2002, 508–509).3  
The proxy for inequality aversion (INEQL) was generated as follows. Respondents 
were questioned about income redistribution: “What is your opinion of the following 
statement? It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in 
income between families with high incomes and those with low incomes.” There 
were five response options, ranging from “1 (strongly disagree)” to “5 (strongly 
agree)”. The proxy for inequality aversion, INEQL, are the values chosen by the 
respondents. It is expected that that people who support income redistribution are 
more inequality averse.  
The degree of community participation within a respondent’s residential area is 
considered as a type of social capital (Putnam 2000). The influence of neighbors 
appears to be greater when people are more inclined to participate in community 
activities. That is, people are thought to be influenced by neighbors to a greater 
extent when they live in areas with higher levels of community participation. In 
this paper, the proxy for social capital is generated using a survey conducted by the 
Japan Broadcasting Corporation (Japan Broadcasting Corporation 1997). One of 
the survey questions asked, “Do you actively participate in community activities?” 
Respondents could choose one of three responses: “yes”, “unsure”, or “no”. Thus, 
Social capital m is the number of respondents who answered “yes” within a 
                                                   
3 Detailed information about JGSS data such as interval-codes for private charitable 
contributions is available from the author upon request. Basic statistics for the 
variables used in this paper are also available upon request.  
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prefecture. 
Derin-Güre and Uler (2010) showed that the coefficient of INEQL takes the 
significant positive sign for high-income groups, whereas INEQL takes the significant 
negative sign for low-income groups. In this paper, in addition to the dependent 
variables used in Derin-Güre and Uler (2010), a cross term between an individual’s 
inequality aversion (INEQLi) and degree of community participation in their 
residential area (Social capital m) was also incorporated. If the hypothesis presented in 
the introduction is supported, the sign of INEQLi * Social capital m becomes positive for 
high-income groups. 
Various individual characteristics were used as control variables, including age, 
marital status, number of children, gender, schooling years, and household income.  
 
3. Results 
Table 1 shows the re-examination of the results of the United States study by 
Derin-Güre and Uler (2010). The signs for INEQL are negative and positive for 
low-income and high-income groups, respectively. Furthermore, INEQL is not 
statistically significant for low-income groups, whereas it is statistically significant for 
high-income groups. The significant positive effect of INEQL is equivalent to that of 
the United States study. However, the significant negative effect of INEQL was 
observed in the earlier United States study but not for Japan. It is interesting to note 
that differences in socio-economic backgrounds between Japan and the United States 
influence the charitable behavior of low-income individuals in the two countries, while 
the difference does not change the behavior of high-income individuals. 
Table 2 shows the cross term of INEQLi * Social capital m, and it produces the 
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positive sign in all columns. However, INEQLi * Social capital m becomes statistically 
significant at the 5% level only for high-income groups. This implies that the level of 
community participation within a residential area only increases the positive effect of 
an individual’s inequality aversion on private charitable contributions for high-income 
groups. The marginal effects of INEQL and Social capital both produce the positive 
sign for high-income groups, whereas they yield the negative sign for low-income 
groups. Furthermore, regarding high-income groups, INEQL is statistically significant 
at the 1% level whereas Social capital is not statistically significant. Neither INEQL 
nor Social capital become statistically significant for low-income groups. Hence, the 
results for the marginal effects of INEQL and Social capital are in line with results 
shown in Table 1. 
Thus, it can be argued that the results in Table 2 show that community 
participation does not directly influence the private charitable contributions of 
high-income groups, but indirectly increases the level of charitable contributions, and 
therefore increases the positive effect of an individual’s inequality aversion. 
 
4. Conclusions 
The estimation results based on the JGSS show that voluntary giving increases 
with inequality aversion for high-income groups, but not for low-income group. This is 
consistent with evidence from the United States based on the GSS (Derin-Güre and 
Uler 2010). Furthermore, the degree of community participation in a respondent’s 
residential area only increases the positive influence of inequality aversion on 
voluntary giving for high-income groups. Thus, social capital increases the 
psychological cost for high-income earners not to give private voluntary contributions. 
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Table 1. Interval regression estimates: dependent variable is the amount of the private 
voluntary contribution 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  (1) 
 Total 
   (2)  
Low income 
 (3) 
High income 
INEQL  –1.12 
  (–0.20)- 
–5.76 
  (–0.70)- 
30.1* 
  (1.95)- 
Age 2.78*** 
 (5.92) 
2.14*** 
 (3.32) 
3.88*** 
 (2.20) 
Marry 
 
  –3.94 
  (–0.22) 
  22.6 
  (1.08) 
–175.0*** 
  (–2.90) 
Number of children 
 
   1.54 
  (0.26) 
   1.78 
  (0.23) 
 –63.3*** 
  (–3.34) 
Male 
 
   2.29 
  (0.20) 
  –14.5 
  (–0.91) 
   68.3** 
  (2.20) 
Schooling 
 
   5.95** 
  (2.03) 
    3.30 
  (0.84) 
    8.37 
  (0.77) 
Income 
 
0.04*** 
(3.25) 
–0.03 
(–1.12) 
0.11*** 
(3.61) 
Constant –247.5*** 
(–3.84) 
–103.8 
(–1.22) 
–295.0 
(–1.24) 
Region dummies (region 
respondents lived in at 15 years of 
age) 
Yes Yes Yes 
Size of local government dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Log-likelihood –2119 –901 –303 
Left-censored observations 183 89 17 
Right-censored observations 8 3 4 
Observations 764 336 116 
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Table 2. Interval regression estimates: dependent variable is the amount of the private 
voluntary contribution 
 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  (1) 
 Total 
   (2)  
Low income 
 (3) 
High income 
INEQL*Social capital 
 
   0.31 
  (0.35) 
1.63 
(1.30) 
7.11** 
  (2.40) 
INEQL  –16.1 
  (–0.37)- 
–83.6 
  (–1.38)- 
–0.28** 
  (–2.16)- 
Social capital 
 
–1.07 
(–0.30) 
  –6.73 
  (–1.30) 
–19.8* 
(–1.84) 
Age 2.78*** 
  (5.92) 
2.12*** 
  (3.28) 
4.36** 
  (2.42) 
Marry 
 
  –4.11 
  (–0.23) 
  24.6 
  (1.18) 
–163.3*** 
  (–2.67) 
Number of children 
 
   1.47 
  (0.25) 
   2.36 
  (0.31) 
 –63.0*** 
  (–3.36) 
Male 
 
   2.02 
  (0.18) 
  –16.0 
  (–0.99) 
   48.6 
  (1.41) 
Schooling 
 
   5.99** 
  (2.04) 
    3.36 
  (0.85) 
    7.79 
  (0.70) 
Income 
 
0.04*** 
(3.23) 
–0.03 
(–1.26) 
0.10*** 
(3.50) 
Constant –196.1 
(–1.08) 
215.9 
(0.84) 
589.6 
(1.04) 
Marginal effect of 
INEQL  
  –0.93 
(–0.16) 
–3.63 
(–0.33) 
41.6*** 
(2.60) 
Marginal effect of 
Social capital 
   0.12 
  (0.10) 
–0.13 
(–0.08) 
   4.43 
(1.01) 
Region dummies (region respondents 
lived in at 15 years of age) 
Yes Yes Yes 
Size of local government dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Log-likelihood –2119 –901 –300 
Left-censored observations 183 89 17 
Right-censored observations 8 3 4 
Observations 764 336 116 
